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Union Democracy and Union 
Renewal
The CAW Public Review Board
JONATHAN EATON1
Unions in the current environment are facing renewed 
 pressures to demonstrate internal democracy and accountability. In 
this context, the Public Review Board (PRB) of the Canadian Auto 
Workers (CAW) deserves attention. The PRB is a unique institution 
within the Canadian labour movement: a body outside the union 
which has the power to make final and binding decisions on issues 
raised by union members. This paper considers the contribution 
of the PRB as a support for democratic renewal. The evolution of 
the PRB, from its origin in 1950s America to its current Canadian
embodiment, is described. The decisions of the PRB over its 
two-decade history in Canada are analyzed and assessed. While 
recognizing the lasting influence of the narrow, procedural vision 
charted by the PRB early in its history, the author concludes that 
the CAW’s PRB is an innovation that merits wider recognition.
In the current environment, unions are facing renewed pressures to 
demonstrate internal democracy and accountability. To respond to the new 
environmental pressures created by market-oriented policies and economic 
restructuring, labour organizations must tap into all of their internal power 
resources. Union democracy represents one key element of achieving this 
goal. The ability to organize internally and externally is enhanced when 
unions are able to reinforce democratic tendencies at the local level. And 
by ensuring that their democratic processes are subject to a visible “rule of 
law,” unions can challenge the damaging perception that they are autocratic 
organizations run by “union bosses.”
– EATON, J., Toronto, Ontario, jonathan.eaton@utoronto.ca
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In this context, the Public Review Board (PRB) of the Canadian Auto 
Workers1 union merits closer scrutiny. The PRB is seen as unique because 
it is an arm’s length body outside the union which has the power to make 
final and binding decisions on issues raised by union members. No other 
union in Canada has subjected the decisions of its leadership to this type 
of external review. To the extent that the PRB is successful in protecting 
members’ rights within the union, and thereby animating and reinforcing 
union democracy, it may provide an innovation of wider significance for 
the labour movement.
This paper examines the experience of public review within the CAW. 
It begins by discussing the importance of union democracy as a cornerstone 
of union renewal. The author then describes the history of the PRB, tracing 
its origins in the United States in the 1950s and its transmission to Canada 
with the birth of the CAW in 1985. The decisions of the PRB over the two 
decades of its existence in Canada are analyzed. This review indicates that 
the PRB has adopted a relatively narrow role in the democratic life of the 
CAW, focused largely on ensuring that due-process rights under the union’s 
constitution are scrupulously observed. In this, albeit limited, role public 
review can have a positive impact on union democracy. As such, the PRB 
represents an innovation that deserves greater recognition and adaptation 
more broadly within the Canadian labour movement.
MOTIVATION
The internal affairs of Canadian unions are not highly regulated by the 
state, in comparison with those of the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Lynk, 2000; Fosh et al., 1993). On the questions of union elections, union 
administration, internal discipline, and the freedoms of speech and dis-
sent, Canadian labour legislation is largely silent, leaving these matters to 
be self-regulated by union constitutions (Lynk, 2000). At the same time, 
unions face a high expectation of democracy, in part because of the com-
pulsory character of collective bargaining in jurisdictions such as Canada 
where unions are granted “exclusive representation” for all employees in 
a bargaining unit, whether the individual workers are union members or 
not, and in part because unions themselves insist that they are democratic 
organizations and claim that as a basis for their legitimacy as the voice of 
workers (Summers and Bellace, 1988; Strauss, 2000).
1. The full name of the union is the National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and 
General Workers’ Union of Canada. It is more commonly known simply as the “CAW” 
and that form is used throughout this paper.
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Unions’ capacity to credibly campaign for greater democracy in 
employment is severely weakened unless they can demonstrate their own 
democratic credentials (Hyman, 1999; Lynk, 2000). In fact, a recent national 
Canadian public opinion poll found that the top reason (cited by 69 percent 
of non-union workers) for not wanting to join a union was that “members 
have no say in how the union operates” (CLC, 2003: 41). The survey’s 
authors conclude that “fear of unions—not employers—is the most powerful 
obstacle in organizing” (CLC, 2003: 40).2
Michels’ (1949) “Iron Law of Oligarchy” argues that democracy 
within labour organizations will inevitably become a casualty to leader 
opportunism and the negative consequences of staff professionalization and 
bureaucracy. While Michels’ prime concern was with the political arm of 
labour, the socialist parties, his conclusions have been applied to all labour 
organizations (Muthuchidambaram, 1969). Voss and Sherman (2000) note 
that this thesis contains two major components. Over time, organizations 
tend to develop oligarchical leadership, despite formal democratic practices, 
because as organizations grow they rely increasingly on professional staff, 
and a gap grows between the leaders and the members. In turn, the goals 
and tactics of the organization are transformed in a conservative direction 
as leaders become concerned above all with organizational survival. The 
labour movement has been seen as exemplifying this pattern of entrenched 
leadership and conservative transformation (Voss and Sherman, 2000; 
Appelbaum and Blaine, 1975), and much of the empirical literature on 
union governance has been characterized as a referendum on the validity 
of Michels’ hypothesis (Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney, 2000; Summers and 
Bellace, 1988).
The current challenges facing the labour movement have given new rel-
evance to this discussion. The widely held belief that unions must embrace 
the so-called organizing model of union renewal places union democracy 
at the forefront of efforts to revitalize the union movement (Jarley, Fiorito 
and Delaney, 2000). In order to shift significant resources into organizing, 
it is argued that unions must reduce the staff and resources consumed by 
servicing. Members are left to pick up the slack, for example by handling 
most workplace grievances without the help of a union staff representative. 
The entire organization must be realigned towards the overriding objective 
2. Respondents who had indicated that they would not “very likely” vote for a union were 
asked to indicate if each option from a list of potential reasons was a major reason, a minor 
reason, or not a reason that they were not likely to vote for a union. Sixty-nine percent 
of non-union members responding to this question indicated that “Members have no say 
in how the union operates” was a major (43 percent) or minor (26 percent) reason. This 
telephone poll of 2007 Canadians was conducted in August, 2003, by Vector Research 
+ Development Inc. (see CLC, 2003).
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of organizing new members. This change is often described in the U.S. as a 
shift from a “servicing” model—trying to help people by solving problems 
for them—to an “organizing” model—emphasizing the need for “member 
mobilization, collective action, and militancy” (Fletcher and Hurd, 1998).
Shifting resources to organizing requires that unions concomitantly 
reduce funds spent on servicing. This necessarily reduces the role of union 
staff in the life of members and promotes instead new levels of commitment 
and participation by the members themselves (Voss and Sherman, 2000; 
Strauss, 2000). For unions to thrive and grow in the new environment, 
then, it is necessary that they counter oligarchical tendencies by breaking 
down bureaucratization and empowering members. In this light, Lévesque 
and Murray (2002: 54) argue that for unions, “democracy has never been 
a more important power resource.”
Achieving democracy within unions requires more than just member 
activism. A “democratic union,” according to Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 
(1996: 4), must combine three basic features:
• a democratic constitution (i.e., guarantees of basic civil liberties and 
political rights);
• institutional opposition (i.e., the freedom of members to criticize and 
debate union officials and to organize, oppose, and replace officials 
through freely contested elections among contending political asso-
ciations, or “factions”); and
• an active membership (i.e., maximum participation by its members 
in the actual exercise of power within the union and in making the 
decisions that affect them) [emphasis in original].
The governance structure of the union must be built around these 
democratic principles. As Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney (2000: 228) note, 
union governance systems are structures designed to identify, legitimize, and 
foster member commitment to organizational goals and leaders. Maintaining 
legitimacy requires mechanisms for ensuring that leaders and staff act in 
ways consistent with the organization’s goals. Ultimately, the development 
of essentially democratic structures for conflict resolution within unions, 
allowing discontented rank-and-file members the space to assert their posi-
tions, is required to promote membership solidarity and support for the 
leadership (French and Giacobbe, 1990).
Typically the tribunal of last resort within a union’s internal appeal 
structure is the executive board or the constitutional convention. Neither of 
these bodies is an ideally neutral and impartial tribunal, especially when the 
issues involved have a background in union politics (Brooks, 1961; Oberer, 
1959; Anderson, 1977; Summers and Bellace, 1988). National union  officers 
are able to exercise effective control over these appeal procedures and 
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appeal decisions overwhelmingly tend to favour the union administration 
(Craypo, 1969).3 The leadership of the union is left to interpret the law that 
it executes in accordance with its own political interests and its own ideas 
of what is good for the organization and its membership (Oberer, 1959). 
The aim of voluntary impartial review by a public review board, as outlined 
in the remainder of this paper, is to overcome the limits of internal appeal 
procedures while maintaining the integrity of the organization.
ORIGINS OF THE PRB
The PRB4 traces its origin to the widespread publicity given to alleged 
union corruption by the United States Senate’s McClellan Committee in 
the late 1950s. The McClellan Committee’s hearings led to calls for gov-
ernment intervention and ultimately to passage of the Landrum-Griffin 
Act (the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act) in 1959.5 The 
investigations of this committee revealed extensive corruption and racketeer-
ing in a relatively small number of American unions (Klein, 1964). While 
the creation of the UAW PRB was not a direct response to the McClellan 
Committee hearings, the UAW leadership was clearly influenced by the 
headlines being made by this committee and the possibility that in the public 
mind all labour might be “indicted for the sins of a few unions” (Stieber, 
1961: 4) and ultimately have to face more invasive legislated interventions 
on internal union affairs (Klein, 1964).
As UAW president, Walter Reuther stated when asking the union’s 
convention delegates to create the UAW PRB: “You ought to recognize 
that this is the real thing, there are no ifs, ands, buts, or loopholes. . . . you 
ought to recognize that this gets into an area that we are either going to 
have to deal with voluntarily or the government will deal with it for us” 
(as quoted in Stieber, 1961: 5). By adopting a system of impartial public 
review, the UAW leadership hoped to reduce effectively the possibility of 
improper practices within their internal structures and, at the same time, to 
3. Craypo (1969) found that in only 15 of approximately 2000 convention appeals reviewed 
from a 21-year period did the convention rule contrary to the position taken by the national 
officers. Craypo (1969: 509) suggests that a structure such as the UAW PRB provides 
the best institutional means of avoiding direct government control over union appeal 
procedures while removing internal appeals from the national convention.
4. For convenience, the Public Review Board of the United Auto Workers (UAW) is referred 
to in the following discussion as the “UAW PRB”. 
5. The Landrum-Griffin Act sought to make unions responsible and responsive to their 
members by laying down regulations for unions’ internal conduct, modeled on American 
political elections (Fosh et al., 1993; Summers and Bellace, 1988; Summers, 2000).
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repair in some measure the tattered image of the labour movement (Klein, 
1964; Klein, 1981).
This was also an era in which there was increasing concern that indi-
vidual rights were threatened by the emergence of large bureaucratized 
organizations (Oberer, 1959; Harrington, 1960). The UAW had grown 
rapidly to a union with over a million members. One long-time UAW 
member, quoted by Harrington (1960: 51) defined the problem as follows: 
“In the old days, we didn’t need a Public Review Board. The membership 
was smaller, and the leaders were closer to the rank and file. And then, 
there used to be factions in every local. When a man had a grievance, one 
side or the other would jump at the chance to take up his defense. Now the 
factions don’t exist in a lot of locals, the union is bigger, the leaders are 
more distant. That is why we have a Review Board.”
An amendment to the UAW constitution at the union’s 1957 biennial 
convention created the UAW PRB as “a supreme court” for the union to 
deal with internal grievances (Oberer, 1959: 57). It was given the “authority 
and duty to make final and binding decisions” in all cases placed before it 
by aggrieved members or subordinate bodies of the UAW. In addition, the 
PRB was mandated to deal with “alleged violations of the AFL-CIO ethi-
cal practices codes, or ethical practices codes adopted by the international 
union” (UAW, 1957).
The constitutional amendment creating the UAW PRB included no 
provision for the removal of a board member from office before expiry of 
his or her term, underlining the independence of this body (Brooks, 1961). 
Aside from its funding, the UAW PRB was set up to be completely autono-
mous. The new board was instructed to make its own rules, hire its own 
staff, and set up its own offices, physically separate from the UAW (UAW, 
1957). Board members set their own compensation (Stieber, 1961). Rabbi 
Morris Adler, the UAW PRB’s first chair, asserted that: “We are subject 
to no authority except our own conscience” (Crellin, 1957: 7). The original 
seven appointees to the UAW PRB were carefully selected to represent in 
some measure the diversity of the union, including representatives of three 
major faiths (a Catholic priest, a Protestant Bishop, and a Jewish Rabbi), an 
African American judge, a college president, and a Canadian magistrate.6
The establishment of the UAW PRB was seen at the time as a momen-
tous event by many observers of the labour movement. Brooks (1961: 64) 
states: “It is doubtful that any other private association of individuals of 
comparable size and power has ever voluntarily relinquished power of this 
6. Magistrate J. Arthur Hanrahan of Windsor. Subsequent Canadian members of the UAW 
PRB included Professor Harry Arthurs and Professor Paul Weiler.
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magnitude to another group.” Similarly, Oberer (1959: 57) writes that: “The 
uniqueness of such renunciation of power by an organization of the size and 
consequence of the UAW to a tribunal of outsiders hardly needs remark.”7
Stieber (1961: 3) adds that the establishment of the PRB “represents the 
broadest grant of authority over its internal affairs ever voluntarily given 
to a labor organization—or any other organization for that matter—to an 
outside body.”
Lichtenstein (1995), in contrast, suggests that Reuther’s primary moti-
vation for creating the PRB was to “depoliticize” internal disputes involv-
ing members and staff with past communist affiliations. He notes (at 325) 
that while the PRB “proved a remarkably popular innovation, especially 
in liberal-labor circles, where it seemed further proof of Reuther’s demo-
cratic and progressive instincts . . . the board’s function was also that a of a 
convenient buck-passer.” The UAW PRB’s first case dealt with the fate of 
eleven union staff members and local officials whose complete break with 
their past Communist Party associations had been questioned by Senator 
Barry Goldwater and other Republications anxious to embarrass the UAW 
(Lichtenstein, 1995; Lauren, 1957). The UAW PRB was asked to rule on 
the legitimacy of the union retaining these officers and staff members. The 
fact that the UAW international executive board referred these cases with-
out itself taking any action on them certainly heightened the appearance of 
“buck passing” (Stieber, 1961).
The PRB’s decision in this case—upholding the right of these union 
staffers and officials to hold office—was widely publicized (Nicholson, 
1957; The Detroit Times, 1957; The New York Times, 1957; Business Week,
1958). It is noteworthy, however, that the Board’s decision was not based on 
a sweeping reaffirmation of the civil rights of members, but rather on a more 
narrow observation that nothing in the UAW constitution barred “former” 
communists from office8 and there was no basis to overturn the decisions 
of the local union appeal bodies to retain these members. The UAW PRB 
concluded that the executive board and the local unions had acted in accord 
with the UAW constitution; the Board did not concern itself with whether 
or not the men actually were in conflict with any code of ethics.
From the outset, the UAW PRB appears to have been primarily 
 concerned with the question of whether appellants enjoyed all of the 
 procedural rights to which they were entitled under the UAW constitution. 
In respect to substantive issues, the PRB exhibited a reluctance to super-
impose its judgment upon that of the international executive board and any 
7. Note that Oberer and Brooks were the first two executive directors of the UAW’s PRB.
8. Both the AFL-CIO ethical practices code and the UAW constitution at that time barred 
racketeers, communists and fascists from holding union office (Lauren, 1957: 31).
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 subordinate bodies which had earlier considered the matter (Brooks, 1961). 
The main impact of the UAW PRB in its early decisions was seen in forcing 
the union to adhere to its own procedural requirements in appeals cases. 
So, for example, an international executive board decision to invalidate a 
local union election was overturned on the basis that the executive board 
committee that heard the appeal had two rather than three members present 
(Stieber, 1961).
Two general limitations were placed on the UAW PRB’s scope of 
review (Klein, 1964). The constitutional amendment creating the Board 
explicitly precluded it from reviewing the collective bargaining policy of 
the union. The UAW PRB was also prohibited from dealing with union 
decisions regarding the processing of grievances unless there was an 
allegation that the grievance was improperly handled because of “fraud, 
discrimination, or collusion with management.”9 From the start, the UAW 
PRB gave a very narrow definition to the words “fraud, discrimination, or 
collusion,” and a very broad definition to “collective bargaining policy,” 
thus limiting its jurisdiction to hear a potentially large number of cases. 
The UAW PRB’s tendency to apply a narrow interpretation on technical 
matters, such as timeliness of submissions, has been criticized as further 
restricting access for rank-and-file members (Krouner, 1969). Even long-
time UAW PRB Executive Director David Klein (1964) acknowledges that 
the Board’s approach to the interpretation of the union’s constitution has 
been essentially conservative.
As noted above, the UAW PRB, as originally conceived, had a dual 
role: it served as both the supreme court for the union in cases appealed to 
it; and it had additional power to act with respect to alleged violations of 
any AFL-CIO or UAW ethical practices code. However, the UAW PRB 
never embraced the latter role as an ethical watchdog (Klein, 1964). Brooks 
(1961) notes that for the UAW PRB to effectively engage in policing an 
area as broad as that encompassed by the codes, a very large staff stretching 
across the US and Canada would have been required. Business Week noted 
in 1960 that: “The board has become, in the minds of its members and in 
its actions, strictly an appeal body—a supreme court, rather than a suspi-
cious observer. And, says a member, ‘The board is not anxious to extend 
its jurisdiction.’” (Business Week, 1960). As one (unnamed) member of 
the UAW PRB told Business Week in 1963: “Our purpose was to interpret 
the union’s constitution and not to serve as a moral conscience” (Business
Week, 1963: 74).
9. In 1980 this standard was amended to include the further principle that the PRB could 
hear claims that the processing or disposition of a grievance was “without rational basis” 
(Klein, 1981).
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In spite of this, Klein (1964: 338) writes that the UAW PRB in its early 
years was “enormously successful to the Union in is public relations,” as 
PRB hearings were widely covered in local and national newspapers. At 
the same time, a concern that was identified early by Harrington (1960: 52) 
was that a majority of the UAW’s members were, at best, only dimly aware 
of the existence of the Board. Not surprisingly, consciousness of the UAW 
PRB was found to be much higher in locals where high profile cases had 
been heard. Similarly, Blaine and Zeller (1965) found that UAW PRB appel-
lants, taken as a group, were much more likely to be politicized and active 
in the union than other UAW members surveyed.10 They concluded that 
the clientele of the UAW PRB was made up primarily of minority political 
or factional leaders within the union. While noting that the existence of an 
impartial forum to at least hear the concerns of dissident local leaders has 
value in the maintenance of democracy, Blaine and Zeller (1965) reiterate 
the criticism that the UAW PRB’s early decision to limit itself to questions 
of a procedural nature had handicapped it as an effective instrument of 
democratic processes. The impression left is that this institution emerged 
as much less than it might have been.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the UAW PRB has been identified by 
the UAW leadership in the modern era as critical to the union’s identity. In 
2001, then UAW President Stephen Yokich underscored the commitment 
of the UAW to the PRB when he said that the issue of retaining the PRB 
was the biggest obstruction in unification talks with the Machinists and 
Steelworkers unions: “Without the PRB, we couldn’t merge,” Yokich said 
(UAW, 2001). As discussed below, the evolution of the UAW PRB has 
cast a long shadow on its counterpart in Canada.
THE CAW PRB
At the founding convention of the CAW (initially known as the 
UAW Canada) in 1985, President Bob White stated that the new union’s 
constitution aimed to reflect the good parts of the UAW’s history while 
making  fundamental changes in structure in select areas.11 The PRB fell 
into the former category. As White stated (see Graham, 1985: 30), the new 
 constitution “retains the basic democratic principles and rights of members 
to appeal, not only to the Executive Board, but to a Canadian public review 
10. The data analyzed by Blaine and Zeller (1965) were gathered by the use of nearly 
identical questionnaires from a sample of 113 PRB appellants and a random sample, 
drawn from four locals, of 290 Central Ohio UAW members, none of whom had ever 
lodged an appeal to the PRB.
11. Such as the composition of the national executive board.
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board, a panel of distinguished Canadians—not members of the UAW, 
not part of the labour movement—which will be the watchdog over our 
organization, to make sure that we insist on internal democracy when our 
members have the right to appeal.”
The new CAW constitution stated that the PRB was established “for 
the purpose of ensuring a continuation of high moral and ethical standards 
in the administrative practices of the National union and its subordinate 
bodies, and to further strengthen the democratic processes and appeal 
procedures within the Union as they affect the rights and privileges of 
individual members or subordinate bodies” (Article 25, Section 1 of the 
CAW Constitution12). This language is virtually identical to that found in 
the UAW constitutional amendments of 1957. As with the UAW PRB, 
the CAW PRB was designed to serve as the final body to hear appeals of 
claims arising under the Constitution’s internal remedy procedures.13 The 
PRB is also the exclusive appellate authority for claims of violations of the 
union’s Ethical Practices Codes.14
The normal route of appeal for a CAW member is first to the member-
ship or delegate body immediately responsible (typically the local union), 
then to the national executive board (NEB), and finally to the PRB. Appeals 
are heard by a panel of three PRB members. The PRB Rules of Procedure15
require that the national union file, along with its answer to the appeal, the 
complete written record in the case, including all correspondence, writ-
ten arguments, minutes, transcripts and exhibits submitted in connection 
with the local union and national union proceedings. The PRB makes its 
decision based on that material. Additional evidence can be presented to 
the members of the panel only in exceptional circumstances (Rules of 
Procedure, section 11).
Alan Borovoy, General Counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, was named as the PRB’s first chairperson (Graham, 1985: 
30), and he continues to fill that role. The appointment of Borovoy, among 
Canada’s foremost experts on civil liberties, gave the PRB an immediate 
level of credibility. Borovoy’s views on a variety of civil liberties issues 
were well documented (see Borovoy, 1988). The remaining PRB members 
12. Available at: www.caw.ca. 
13. As with the UAW, CAW appellants can also choose to take appeals under the CAW’s 
constitution to the Convention Appeals Committee.
14. There are four Ethical Practice Codes: Democratic Practices; Financial Practices; 
Health, Welfare, and Retirement Funds; and Business and Financial Activities of Union 
Officials. There have not been any PRB cases so far dealing with these Ethical Practice 
Codes.
15. Reproduced in CAW-Canada (2003).
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are impartial citizens of national stature from outside the CAW. Members 
serve for three-year terms between constitutional conventions. Nominees are 
put forward by the national CAW president and are subject to approval by 
the national executive board (Frost, 2000). In addition to Borovoy, the first 
members of the CAW PRB included a Catholic Bishop, a former Moderator 
of the United Church of Canada, a labour journalist, and a former Ontario 
Ombudsman.16
The CAW PRB is registered as a tax-exempt non-profit organization. It 
depends on grants from the CAW, in addition to any interest income earned 
from these grants. Since 1985, the CAW has provided grants totaling close 
to $600,000. While the funding provided to the PRB has grown over time, 
it represents a minimal aspect of the CAW’s overall budget.
Since its inception, the PRB has maintained a relatively low profile. The 
PRB has a web site (www.cawprb.ca) containing basic information describ-
ing the board and how members can access it. Interestingly, the CAW’s own 
web site (www.caw.ca) contains almost no information on the PRB, and 
does not even contain a link to the PRB’s site. In its second report, the PRB 
suggested that the union consider making “special assistance” available to 
those members who seek redress from the Board (CAW-Canada, 1994). This 
suggestion did not lead to a specific response. In addition, while the PRB’s 
Rules of Procedure indicate that copies of decisions will be sent to “various 
colleges and universities, libraries, news media, private publishing services, 
and individual subscribers to the decisions of the PRB,” this has not been the 
practice. The PRB, in contrast to the early experience of the UAW PRB, has 
never enjoyed any level of media recognition. As suggested below, the influ-
ence of the PRB on the democratic life of the CAW has been more subtle.
ANALYSIS OF PRB DECISIONS
The volume of cases heard by the PRB is not large, considering the 
size of the union (now comprising over 260,000 members). In its first five 
years of existence, the PRB heard just four appeals. In the period covered 
by this study, from 1985 to the end of 2004, the PRB issued decisions in a 
total of 47 cases. In 12 of these appeals, the PRB reversed a decision of the 
NEB. However, when one accounts for the substantial number of appeals 
dismissed due to the PRB’s limited constitutional jurisdiction concerning 
grievances and collective bargaining policy, the rate of reversal of the NEB 
is about one case in three. This is likely to be significantly higher than the 
success rate of members appealing to the triennial constitutional convention, 
16. The original members in addition to Alan Borovoy were: Bishop Adophe Proulx, Lois 
Wilson, Wilfred List, and Daniel G. Hill.
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the only other final court of appeal within the union. Unlike the process 
before a constitutional convention, the appellant before the PRB is also 
more likely to get a full hearing of their case, and likely at less expense, 
given that the appellant avoids the cost of attending the convention. An oral 
hearing was held in 36 of the 47 cases. While the largest number of PRB 
hearings (22) have been held in Toronto, the Board will travel to locations 
closer to the appellant, and hearings have been held in Oshawa, Vancouver, 
London, Kitchener and Halifax. The relative informality of the process is 
suggested by the fact that appellants have been represented by lawyers in 
just four cases.
Frost (2000: 277) suggests that the PRB, “provides a check on capri-
cious or politically motivated behavior on the part of the National Executive 
Board and, in particular, the National Union President.” In fact, however, 
very few PRB decisions have dealt with the behaviour of the CAW’s 
national president. As was found by Klein (1981) with respect to the UAW 
PRB, the largest number of PRB appeals (18, or about 38 percent of the 
total) have concerned complaints about the handling of grievances or collec-
tive bargaining, in spite of the PRB’s extremely limited jurisdiction in this 
area. Seventeen cases (36 percent) have dealt with local union elections or 
recalls of elected officers. And 12 appeals (26 percent) concerned charges 
against union members.
While the CAW has approximately 280 locals across Canada, almost 
one-third of PRB appeals (14) have come from just one: Local 222 repre-
senting primarily General Motors workers in Oshawa, Ontario. Local 222 
is Canada’s largest private-sector union local, representing over 21,000 
members (Frost, 2000), and a relatively large number of appeals accounted 
for by this local is not surprising. Moreover, the large number of appeals 
generated by members of this local supports the suggestion that the appeal 
process may be more readily taken up by union members in politically more 
sophisticated local unions (Blaine and Zeller, 1965). It also suggests that 
there may be a learning or familiarity effect—locals that have had experi-
ence with the PRB are more likely to use the process in the future. Even 
as the CAW has become increasingly diverse over the years, extending its 
representational reach into sectors such as rail, airlines, fisheries, hospitality, 
retail, and health care, the majority of PRB appeals have come from locals 
within the auto sector. Perhaps reflecting this tendency, just five of the 47 
appeals have involved appellants who were women.
In 12 of its 47 decisions, the PRB cited precedents from the UAW PRB. 
The Canadian PRB has indicated that it would be reluctant to depart from 
the jurisprudence of its American counterpart in the absence of compelling 
circumstances (Case No. 19/96: 3). In a subsequent decision (Case No. 
34/01: 3), the Board added: “since the CAW once lived under those rules, 
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obviously knew about them, and did not significantly change them, the 
Canadian PRB should regard those judgments at least as very persuasive.” 
In a broad sense, the jurisprudence of the PRB has tended to conform to the 
pattern set by the UAW PRB in its substantial body of case law.
The CAW PRB has no jurisdiction concerning the handling of a griev-
ance or collective bargaining policies, unless the appellant has alleged 
before the NEB that the matter was improperly handled because of fraud, 
 discrimination, or collusion with management, or that the union’s  decision
had no rational basis (CAW Constitution, Article 24, subparagraph 
10(c)(ii)). The PRB has followed the direction of its UAW counterpart 
in applying this limitation strictly. In an early case (Case No. 2/88: 2) the 
PRB noted that while the language of the constitution suggests that the PRB 
should avoid substituting its judgment for that of the union, the terminol-
ogy does create “some power” for the board to intervene. In a subsequent 
decision, the PRB stated that its role “is simply to ensure that the Union 
has behaved with integrity and rationality” (Case No. 13/95: 3). Using a 
phrase frequently repeated in subsequent decisions, the PRB has held that, 
to meet the requirement of rationality, the union must merely be “within 
the ball park of reasonable judgment” (Case No. 9/93: 4). In all of these 
 decisions the PRB found that the union had not acted improperly in  dropping 
a grievance that the grievor wanted to pursue.
In another case (Case No. 23/97), a skilled trades worker complained 
that, as a result of amendments to his collective agreement, he had lost ten 
years of seniority earned as a production worker. He alleged that the plant 
workers within his local had taken advantage of their numerical strength to 
discriminate against the skilled trades people in the unit. In responding to 
this complaint, the PRB stated that, as long as the decision makers in the 
local union avoid “gross improprieties,” the PRB must adopt a “hands off” 
policy. The PRB reiterated that the whole thrust of the CAW’s constitutional 
provision was to leave local unions free to develop their own collective 
bargaining policies, and to determine which interests ought to prevail in 
these situations. Even on the core issue of seniority, the PRB noted, there 
were validly competing points of view, and it was not open to the review 
board members to insinuate their preferences into the mix. The PRB in 
this case indicated that it would intervene if, for example, a local union 
provided that Blacks, women, Conservative Party members, or opponents 
of the union president were not eligible for certain jobs or to enjoy senior-
ity, as there could be no reasonable justification to deny seniority or a job 
on such irrelevant grounds.17
17. The PRB has recognized that it was reasonable for the CAW to negotiate super-seniority 
status for a “Worker of Colour / Aboriginal representative” that was added, along with 
a women’s representative, to a local union’s executive board (Case No. 43/04).
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The test is tough, but not impossible, for appellants to meet. In Case 
No. 26/99, two members of CAW Local 222 appealed against the decision 
of their national union representative to withdraw certain “work ownership” 
grievances. Their employer had brought in outside contractors to perform 
work normally done by its own skilled trades employees. In this case, the 
PRB found that the union’s withdrawal of the grievance directly contra-
vened the CAW’s declared policy of trying to arbitrate the kind of “work 
ownership” issues involved. The Board could find no rational basis for the 
decision, and ordered the CAW to process the grievances.
Furthermore, there may be a limited scope for appellants to overturn 
decisions regarding grievances where it can be shown that the union’s 
actions fell short of due process. In Case No. 14/95, the PRB intervened 
in a grievance case because it found that the grievor had been given no 
opportunity to argue his position before the membership of his local union. 
“The key to due process,” the PRB noted (at 3), “is that people have a fair 
chance to make their case before they are effectively injured by an adverse 
decision.” The PRB thus remitted the case to the NEB with instructions 
that the appellant—and other members who could be impacted by a change 
in the impugned seniority rules—be given “a full and fair opportunity to 
make his case at the Local Union level.”
In Case No. 42/03 the PRB considered the effect of a “last chance” 
agreement reinstating a grievor who had been fired for unjustified absence 
from his plant. A condition of the settlement was that the grievor would 
never again seek union office while he was an employee of this company. 
The PRB found that this condition was unenforceable because it had not 
been put in writing. The Board concluded that such “precious rights” as the 
right to seek and hold union office could not be subject to surrender on the 
basis of a mere oral agreement—illustrating the PRB’s desire to reinforce 
internal democracy, while focusing on the narrow procedural aspects of 
the claim.18
Appellants have generally had little success in challenging decisions 
of the national union regarding local union elections and recall of local 
union officers. In just three of 17 such cases were NEB decisions regard-
ing election or recall overturned. In its first decision (Case No. 1/88), the 
PRB held that the onus was on the individual seeking to overturn an elec-
tion to demonstrate irregularities with respect to the procedure. The PRB 
concluded it was not prepared, on the basis of mere conjecture, to subject 
this local union to the “expense, inconvenience, and perhaps even ordeal, 
18. The PRB also noted that, while such “last chance” agreements setting conditions on 
reinstatement might be permissible, a lifetime ban on seeking union office was incom-
patible with the spirit of the CAW Constitution.
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of a re-election,” even though a majority of the unit’s members in that case 
had signed a petition indicating that they had, in fact, voted for the losing 
candidate.19
In a subsequent decision (Case No. 6/92), the PRB refined the onus 
facing appellants in election cases, noting that the impugning of an elec-
tion should not necessarily require proof of fraud or deception. Defeated 
candidates cannot be expected to be “private investigators,” the PRB noted. 
In some cases, the presence of “extremely loose” election practices may be 
sufficient to have the results set aside. The test for setting aside elections in 
such circumstances concerns “the extent to which the election irregularities 
were of such a nature and magnitude that they could readily facilitate and 
conceal a significant level of fraud and deception.” The PRB further con-
cluded that, in some situations, a sufficiently flawed process might nullify 
an election even if the result could not have been affected by such practices. 
In this case, the PRB found that practices of the local, such as holding the 
election without voters’ lists or any adequate record of which members had 
voted at multiple polling stations, represented “deficiencies of a fundamental 
character.” On this basis, a new election was ordered.20
The PRB has shown a similar reluctance to interfere with membership 
decisions regarding the recall of local union officers. In such cases, the 
PRB has stated (Case No. 16/95: 3), “the overriding consideration must 
be to vindicate the sovereignty of the membership.” In this case, the PRB 
declined to overturn the recall of a unit chairperson following a 160–to–9 
membership recall vote against him, in spite of the fact that the allegations 
against the unit chairperson had never been adequately set out during the 
recall proceedings. “The sole issue for us to determine,” the PRB stated 
(at 7), “is whether, right or wrong, the members are entitled to have their 
say. Unless overriding considerations were evident . . . the membership 
view must prevail.”
The PRB has demonstrated a greater readiness to intervene in union 
decisions in the limited number of cases involving union discipline of mem-
bers and officers. Half of the appeals in this category have been upheld, 
at least in part, by the PRB. In one of its most complex and detailed deci-
sions to date (Case No. 15/95), for example, the PRB attempted to sort out 
a morass of charges and counter-charges at the then new airline local of 
19. Following earlier decisions by the UAW PRB, the Board refused to give any weight 
to this petition signed by a majority of members after the election, disputing the elec-
tion result. The PRB concurred with its American counterpart that such evidence was 
inherently unreliable.
20. The same questionable election practices at this local led the PRB to order a new  election 
in a related case (Case No. 7/92).
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the CAW. As a result, the PRB made no less than 14 orders, dismissing 
some charges and reinstituting others. In another recent decision (Case 
No. 45/04), the PRB took the unprecedented step of ordering the union to 
send a letter drafted by the PRB to every member of the relevant bargain-
ing unit and to post it conspicuously in that workplace for a period of 30 
days. The goal was to “vindicate the dignity” of a union member whom 
the PRB felt had suffered “significant unpleasantness” at the hands of a 
union officer and fellow members—behaviour that no other mechanism 
(such as charges requested by the member under the CAW constitution) 
could adequately redress.
Of interest is the PRB’s discussion of charges of “conduct unbecoming” 
filed against a member as a result of correspondence in which he alleged 
that the local president had “personally engineered one of [her] friends into 
the . . . ‘affirmative action position’”. The charges that resulted against 
the member stated that he “repeatedly derides the Local’s steps towards 
gender equity” and “he clearly objects to affirmative action initiatives.” In 
dismissing these charges, the PRB underlined (at 6) its commitment to pro-
moting free speech, noting (at 8) that the integrity of democratic processes 
within unions can be “significantly imperiled” by charges that “effectively 
muzzle criticisms union members wish to make.” This case illustrates again 
that, while the PRB has seen its main role as insisting that due process 
be respected for union members under the CAW constitution, it has also 
attempted to animate the constitution by ensuring that the conditions for 
dissent and nonconformity within local unions can exist.
CONCLUSION
The point is not that we have reached some ideal democracy but that 
we have found and developed in the Public Review Board a reliable 
democratic feedback mechanism which can discover and remedy 
bureaucratic shortcomings in redressing the complaints of members.
UAW President Walter Reuther
(UAW Solidarity, 1968: 5)
The CAW’s PRB is neither more nor less than the “feedback mecha-
nism” described by Reuther above. Commentators have suggested that the 
outstanding contribution of a public review body is that its mere existence 
provides a measure of restraint on the union hierarchy (Brooks, 1961; 
Oberer, 1959) and fosters an increased awareness and respect among the 
union leadership for the importance of due process as set forth under the 
union’s constitution (Stieber, 1961; Harrington, 1960). In this respect, the 
relatively small number of cases heard by the PRB is seen as a measure 
of its success, as the existence of the Board itself tends to deter improper 
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behaviour. The union’s willingness to submit its decisions to public review 
is seen as increasing the stature of the union, thereby strengthening it not 
only structurally but also as a political and collective bargaining organiza-
tion (Stieber, 1961). By giving members the opportunity to take cases to an 
impartial third party, public review creates the opportunity to both do justice 
and “impart a sense of justice having been done” (Oberer, 1959: 80).
Protections for due process may assure that the prerequisites of fair-
ness are provided, but do not, in themselves promote the participation of 
members in the political life of the union (Lynk, 2000). An early review 
of the UAW PRB (Harrington, 1960) found that the impact of the Board 
depended largely on the level of democracy already existing within UAW 
locals: “Where the membership is apathetic, the reform has meant little. 
. . . Seen from the vantage point of the local, public review has not been 
a miraculous solution for all the problems of union democracy, but it has 
been a spur and a complement to those democratic tendencies that do 
exist.” Public review acts to strengthen these democratic tendencies and 
to establish a “rule of law” for political struggles within the union. Public 
review, Harrington (1960: 64) concludes, is not a substitute for democracy 
but an important procedural guarantee which supports the conditions for a 
vibrant democracy to exist.
The PRB in Canada has followed, but not extended, this approach. 
The PRB has not sought a more expansive definition of its role, and, in 
fact, has largely embraced the somewhat narrow constitutional perspective 
articulated in the Board’s early years. While the PRB may have inherited 
certain shortcomings, it can also boast a measure of success. It has provided 
an effective and perceptibly independent forum for addressing member 
concerns, particularly regarding the union’s electoral and internal discipline 
procedures. It provides CAW members with an avenue of redress that is 
far more effective, from the member’s point of view, than the alternative 
found in most union constitutions of appeal to the union’s national or 
international convention.
The concept of public review began in the cold war era of the McClellan 
Committee. Today, unions face new challenges that once again have given 
rise to calls for measures that will enhance internal democracy. Public 
review alone will not address these concerns, but it does provide a tool 
for reinforcing the democratic tendencies that exist within unions. It is 
unfortunate that the creation of PRB has not been followed by any other 
Canadian union. The PRB has a modest profile even within the CAW’s 
own convention documents, web site and related communications material. 
Given the current demands for democratic renewal within unions, broader 
recognition should be given to the PRB and its unique contribution to union 
democracy.
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RÉSUMÉ
La démocratie syndicale et le regain du syndicalisme : le cas de 
la Commission indépendante d’appel des TCA
Les syndicats dans le contexte actuel font face à des pressions nou-
velles : on leur demande de faire preuve de plus de démocratie à l’interne 
et d’imputabilité. Dans ce contexte, la Commission indépendante d’appel 
des TCA-Canada (Syndicat national de l’automobile, de l’aérospatiale, du 
transport et des autres travailleurs et travailleuses du Canada) mérite qu’on 
s’y intéresse. Cette commission est une institution unique au sein du mou-
vement syndical canadien. C’est un organisme extérieur au syndicat qui a 
le pouvoir de décision finale et exécutoire sur des litiges soulevés par les 
membres. Aucun autre syndicat au Canada n’a soumis les décisions de sa 
direction à ce type de révision externe. Cet essai présente la contribution 
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de la Commission indépendante d’appel comme un appui au renouvelle-
ment démocratique.
L’article débute par une discussion de l’importance de la démocratie 
syndicale vue comme la pierre angulaire d’un regain syndical. La gouverne 
interne des syndicats au Canada n’est pas fortement réglementée par l’État. 
En contrepartie, les syndicats font face à des attentes élevées en termes de 
démocratie; en grande partie, parce qu’ils disposent de la représentation 
exclusive pour l’ensemble des salariés d’une unité de négociation et égale-
ment parce qu’ils insistent pour être qualifiés d’organisations démocratiques 
et ils revendiquent cela comme un appui à leur légitimité en se présent-
ant comme le moyen d’expression des travailleurs. La « loi d’airain de 
l’oligarchie » de Michels (1949) laisse entendre que la démocratie au sein 
des organisations syndicales fait face à une continuelle érosion, due à 
l’opportunisme des leaders et aux effets négatifs de la professionnalisation 
du personnel et de la bureaucratisation. Les défis actuels auxquels fait face le 
mouvement ouvrier confère une nouvelle signification à cet enjeu. Pour que 
les syndicats puissent fonctionner et croître dans le nouvel environnement, 
il est nécessaire qu’ils puissent contrer les tendances à l’oligarchie en 
réduisant l’ampleur de la bureaucratisation et en donnant plus de pouvoir à 
leurs membres. En retour, le développement de structures démocratiques de 
résolution de conflits au sein des syndicats, permettant à la base syndicale 
de faire connaître ses positions, devient une nécessité en vue de favoriser 
la solidarité du membership et d’offrir un support au leadership.
L’article se poursuit en retraçant l’évolution de la Commission indépen-
dante d’appel depuis ces origines dans l’Amérique des années 1950, une 
époque où le mouvement ouvrier se trouvait étroitement surveillé à cause 
de la corruption répandue et du gangstérisme qu’on retrouvait dans un petit 
nombre de syndicats américains. Le syndicat des TUA (Travailleurs unis de 
l’automobile), précurseur des TCA (Travailleurs canadiens de l’automobile) 
avait mis sur pied un système de révision publique en 1957, afin de réduire 
véritablement la possibilité de pratiques incorrectes au sein de leur structure 
interne et, en même temps, afin de refaire l’image ternie du mouvement 
ouvrier. Cependant, tout en accordant des pouvoirs élargis à titre de chien 
de garde moral du syndicat, cette commission, dès le départ, a opté pour 
un rôle technique en faisant observer la constitution du syndicat. L’auteur 
note que l’évolution de cette commission de révision chez les TUA a jeté 
de l’ombre sur sa contrepartie canadienne. Il décrit ensuite l’établissement 
et la structure de base de la Commission indépendante d’appel des TCA-
Canada, suite à leur scission des TUA. Cette commission sert d’instance 
finale pour disposer des plaintes déposées en vertu des procédures internes 
de réparation de la constitution des TCA. Les caractéristiques principales 
de la commission consistent dans son indépendance à l’endroit du syndicat 
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même et dans son appel à des citoyens impartiaux d’envergure nationale, 
sympathiques au mouvement syndical tout en se tenant en retrait, pour agir 
à titre de membres du conseil.
L’auteur commente ensuite les décisions de la commission au cours 
des deux décennies de son histoire au Canada. La commission a rendu 
des décisions dans 47 cas (au cours de la période étudiée, 1985 à la fin de 
l’année 2004). Le taux d’annulation des décisions du bureau exécutif des 
TCA (environ une sur trois à l’intérieur de la juridiction de la commission) 
est probablement et significativement plus élevé que le taux de succès que 
connaissent les membres qui font appel au comité d’appel du congrès, la 
dernière instance d’appel au sein du syndicat. Les décisions de la commis-
sion ont été classées en trois catégories : les plaintes touchant le traitement 
des griefs ou la conduite des négociations (environ 36 % du total), celles 
concernant les élections dans les syndicats locaux et les rappels d’officiers 
élus (36 %), celles concernant des accusations des membres du syndicat 
(26 %). L’analyse détaillée de ces décisions amène à conclure que, alors 
que la commission voyait son rôle principal comme étant celui de s’assurer 
qu’un processus équitable soit respecté chez les membres assujettis à la 
constitution des TCA, elle a également cherché à donner vie à la constitu-
tion en s’assurant que les conditions de désaccord et de non-conformité 
puissent exister au sein des syndicats locaux.
L’auteur conclut que la commission représente un mécanisme 
démocratique fiable de rétroaction en faisant droit aux plaintes déposées 
par les membres d’un syndicat. Tout en reconnaissant que la Commission 
indépendante d’appel des TCA a grandement adopté une perspective 
constitutionnelle étroite au cours des premières années, il soutient que 
les protections procédurales fournies par la commission jouent un rôle 
important dans le renforcement de la démocratie syndicale. Étant donné 
les exigences actuelles d’un regain démocratique au sein des syndicats, la 
commission et sa contribution à la démocratie syndicale méritent une plus 
grande reconnaissance.
